Democracy is a normative idea. The questions of why political rule may lay claim to obedience in the first place, how democratic procedures can legitimately be binding, and where democratic authority reaches its own limits are central questions of practical philosophy: What do we owe one another as individuals and as a political community, and under what conditions does a form of political rule deserve our consent?

These questions are gaining significance in light of the current crises facing democracy. For instance, disinformation is increasingly undermining the epistemic foundations of public deliberation; populist majorities are challenging constitutional limits; and economic inequality turns formally equal citizens into politically unequal actors. In recent analytical political philosophy, these questions have been posed with renewed precision. Procedural and epistemic justifications of democracy stand in contrast to one another, as do liberal and republican conceptions of freedom; the debate over the institutional prerequisites of political equality has expanded from procedural issues to material conditions. To discuss these questions, we will examine both selected classics (such as those by Mill, Tocqueville, and Kant) and more recent systematic contributions from analytical political philosophy. Ideally, understanding these theoretical approaches will enable us to participate more confidently in debates about democratic decision-making processes.

No prior knowledge of philosophy is required. A prerequisite for participation is a willingness to read the seminar texts regularly—some of which are in English—and to actively participate in the sessions. The texts will be provided at the beginning of the semester.